United Nations S/2014/523

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 July 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 20 July 2014, from H.E. Hussain al-Shahristani, Deputy Prime Minister and acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, addressed to you regarding the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated to the Members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed Ali **Alhakim**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq
to the United Nations

14-58256 (E) 250714 250714

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I have the honour to convey to you the wish of the Government of Iraq that the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) should be extended for a further period of one year, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Mission played a positive and effective role in ensuring the success of the parliamentary elections, which took place peacefully and without any incidents on 30 April 2014. On 15 July 2014, Parliament elected a Speaker and two deputies in a climate of goodwill and democracy. It is now electing a President of the Republic, after which it will form a new national Government of Iraq.

Iraq is going through a sensitive and perilous phase in its recent history. Today, it faces considerable challenges in combating terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Terrorist operations have caused over 1 million Iraqis to leave their homes and jobs in the areas controlled by the terrorist groups. Iraq urgently needs the help of UNAMI in order to provide logistical support and ensure that the displaced families can live with dignity.

Iraq again highlights the important role of the United Nations, particularly UNAMI, in providing advice, support and assistance to the Iraqi people and Government. I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Iraq would like the Mission's mandate to be extended for another year, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the conditions set out in Security Council resolution 1770 (2007). The Government of Iraq would also like the Mission to continue to provide assistance and advice, with the prior approval of the Government and in the manner referred to in my letter of 6 August 2007.

(*Signed*) Hussain **al-Shahristani**
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations A/68/954–S/2014/524

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
24 July 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 55
Questions relating to information

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the transcript of the special briefing held on 21 July 2014 by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the 17 July crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in the Ukrainian airspace (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and the enclosed transcript as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

The text of the transcript and the related video materials can be also found on the Internet at:

www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/ECD62987D4816CA344257D1D00251C76

www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/F6C3BBD89AC2532D44257D1D00203CCF

stat.multimedia.mil.ru/multimedia/video/clips/more.htm?id=5088@morfVideoAudioFile

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

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Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Official website

Special briefing by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the crash of the Malaysian Boeing 777 in Ukrainian airspace, 21 July 2014

Statement by Lieutenant-General A. V. Kartapolov, Chief of the Main Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Members of the media,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Following the crash on 17 July of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 passenger aircraft travelling on the international route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, a substantial amount of conflicting information has come to light in the past few days. The Ministry of Defence therefore considered it necessary to present the objective monitoring data in the possession of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The map shows the international route along which the Boeing 777 was supposed to fly. You will see that, until it reached Donetsk, the aircraft remained within the established corridor, after which it deviated northward from the route. The maximum distance from the left boundary of the corridor was 14 km.


Луганская область
Украина
Харьковская область
Донецкая область
Днепропетровская область
Запорожская область
Луганск
Донецк
Днепропетровск
Условные обозначения

You can see that the Boeing 777 then made a turn to head back into the established airway. However, the Malaysian crew did not have time to complete the manoeuvre. At 1720 hours the aircraft began to slow steadily and at 1723 it disappeared from Russian radar screens. The reason why it flew outside the boundaries of the route — whether the crew made a navigational error or whether they were following orders from the Ukrainian air traffic controller in Dnepropetrovsk — will be ascertained only once the information from the on-board flight recorders, known as the "black boxes", and the communications with air traffic control have been decrypted.

According to our information, on the day that the Malaysian Boeing 777 went down, the air defence force of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had three or four BUK-M1 missile system battalions deployed near Donetsk.

These systems are capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 35 km and an altitude of up to 22 km. Why, and against whom, did the Ukrainian Armed Forces deploy such powerful air defence units in the vicinity of Donetsk? It is well known that the militants do not have any aircraft.

It can be seen from the map that both the flight path and the projected impact point of the Boeing are inside the operating range of the BUK-M1 missiles of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

We have satellite imagery of the different sites where the Ukrainian army's anti-aircraft defences are located in south-eastern Ukraine.

The first three photographs are dated 14 July 2014:

The first photograph shows BUK missile launchers deployed 8 kilometres north-west of Luhansk. On the photograph you can see clearly a self-propelled launch system and two loading vehicles.



The second photograph shows radar systems located 5 km north of Donetsk. Two radar systems as well as various pieces of equipment and facilities can be seen on the photograph.



The third photograph shows the position of the air defence equipment north of Donetsk. You can see clearly on the photograph a self-propelled launch system with the launcher turned, some 60 pieces of military and special-purpose equipment, equipment shelters, and other technical facilities.

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

And here is a photograph of the same area taken on 17 July. Please note that the launch system is missing.



The fifth photograph shows that on the morning of that same day a BUK battery can be seen near the village of Zaroshchinsk, 50 km east of Donetsk and 8 km south of Shakhtarsk. The question arises as to why the battery appeared in this area, near the territory controlled by militants, right before the tragedy.



Photographs of the same area taken on 18 July (photograph 6) showed that the battery had left the position it had previously occupied.

Furthermore, it was precisely on 17 July that the Ukrainian 9S18 Kupol-M1 radar systems of the BUK missile system reached the peak of their activity.

СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ДАННЫЕ О КОЛИЧЕСТВЕ ФУНКЦИОНИРУЮЩИХ РЛС «КУПОЛ» С 15 ПО 20 ИЮЛЯ 2014 Г.



On the slide you can see that 7 systems were in operation on 15 July, 8 were in operation on 16 July and 9 were in operation on 17 July. Since 18 July the radar activity has dropped off sharply and has now reached 2 or 3 per day. The reason for this has yet to be determined.

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I would also like to present information on the situation in the air in the vicinity of Donetsk on that day.

On this slide you can see data derived from objective monitoring conducted during the period from 1710 to 1730 hours Moscow time.



At that time there were three civilian aircraft in the air, carrying out scheduled flights:

A flight from Copenhagen to Singapore at 1717;

A flight from Paris to Taipei at 1724;

The flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

In addition, Russian air traffic control detected a Ukrainian Air Force aircraft, presumably an Su-25, gaining height towards the Malaysian Boeing 777. The distance between the Su-25 and the Boeing 777 was 3-5 km.

The Su-25 is capable of quickly gaining an altitude of 10,000 m. It is armed with an R-60 air-to-air missile capable of locking onto and destroying a target at a distance of up to 12 km and a hit is guaranteed at a distance of up to 5 km.

Why was a military aircraft flying in a civil aviation airway at almost the same time and the same altitude as a civilian passenger aircraft? We would like to have this question answered.

Video recorded by the Rostov Aerial Centre of the Joint Air Traffic Management System corroborates this information. Lieutenant-General Igor Makushev, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will comment on the video.

Commentary by Lieutenant-General I. Y. Makushev, Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today the Federal Air Transport Agency provided objective monitoring materials from the Rostov Aerial Centre of the Unified Air Traffic Management System.

The video recording presents air traffic control data on the situation in the air in the region of Donetsk during the period from 1719 to 1725 hours (Moscow time) on 17 July 2014.

In the upper left corner is a data tag indicating a Boeing 772 aircraft en route from Copenhagen to Singapore.

Below that is another data tag indicating a Boeing 777 aircraft en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

To the right is a data tag indicating a Boeing 778 aircraft en route from Delhi to Birmingham.

All three aircraft are steadily monitored by the three radar stations of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

The Boeing 777 is moving towards the State border of the Russian Federation and should cross it at the point marked "TONAK".

The air traffic controller, tracking the aircraft's flight, constantly enquires about its flight parameters and checks them against the given parameters.

At 1720 hours, at a distance of 51 km from the Russian border at 300 degrees of azimuth, the aircraft suddenly began losing speed, as can clearly be seen from the table of aircraft data.

With the aircraft speed reduced to 200 km/h, at 17 hours 21 minutes 35 seconds a new data tag indicating an aircraft appears at the point of the Boeing crash.

This aircraft was steadily tracked by the Ust-Donetsk and Buturinsk radar stations for four minutes.

The air traffic controller, who requested the identification and details of the newly appeared aircraft, was unable to obtain its parameters, in all likelihood because this aircraft was not equipped with a secondary IFF system, which is typical for military aircraft.

Early detection of the aircraft appeared to be impossible because the situation in the airspace is monitored by radar systems working in standby mode that are able to detect aircraft at that distance only at an altitude of higher than 5,000 metres.

Detection became possible when the aircraft gained altitude.

Subsequent changes in the aircraft's flight parameters along its route indicate that it was flying in the area of the Boeing 777 crash and was monitoring the situation.

Earlier, Ukrainian officials stated that on the day of the accident no Ukrainian military aircraft were flying in that area. As you can see, that is not true. Thank you.

Statement by Lieutenant-General A. V. Kartapolov, Chief of the Main Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

We also have a question for our American colleagues. According to a statement by American officials, the United States has satellite images which show that the missile aimed at the Malaysian aircraft was launched by the militants. But no one has seen these images.

According to our calculations, during the period from 1706 to 1721 hours (Moscow time) on 21 July an American satellite was indeed passing over south-eastern Ukraine. This was a special satellite of the experimental space station designed to detect and track various missile launches. If the Americans do have images from this satellite, we would ask that they show them to the world community for further investigation.

This may or may not be a coincidence, but the Malaysian Boeing 777 crashed at the same time as the American satellite was observing Ukrainian territory.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the information we have presented is based on objective and reliable data from different Russian technical agencies. This is in contrast to the baseless accusations being made against us, one example of which are the images being shown by the media of a BUK-M1 launcher on a trailer supposedly being moved from Ukrainian to Russian territory. This is a clear case of trumped-up material.

These photographs were taken in the city of Krasnoarmiisk, as can be seen from a banner next to the road showing the address of a car dealership at 34 Dnepropetrovskaya Street. Krasnoarmiisk has been under the control of the Ukrainian army since 11 May.

We have a number of questions about this. What kind of launch system is this? Where was it being transported? Where is it now? Why is it not loaded with its full complement of missiles? When was a missile last launched from it?

In closing, I would like to emphasize that the Russian Federation has not given the militants BUK-M4 missile systems or any other type of weapon or military equipment.

The materials prepared today by the Ministry of Defence will be provided to the experts of European countries and Malaysia. I hope that they will help in conducting an objective investigation into the tragedy that occurred on 17 July in the skies over Donetsk.

The Ministry of Defence will inform you of any new facts that come to light concerning the crash of the Malaysian Boeing 777.

Source: Official website of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

United Nations S/2014/525

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 July 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014)

I. Introduction

1. This fifth report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) and paragraph 10 of Council resolution 2165 (2014), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolutions by all Syrian parties to the conflict.

2. The report covers the period from 18 June to 21 July 2014. The information contained in the report is based on the data available to the United Nations actors on the ground as well as reports from open sources and sources of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

II. Major developments

A. Political/military

3. Conflict and high levels of violence continued across the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period, in particular in the Aleppo, Hama, Deir ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, Al-Hasakeh, Homs, Idlib and Dar'a Governorates. Indiscriminate aerial bombings by Government forces and indiscriminate shelling by armed opposition, extremist and designated terrorist groups[1] continued to result in deaths, injuries and displacement of civilians.

4. In Aleppo Governorate, indiscriminate air strikes and the use of barrel bombs by Government forces continued on opposition-held areas of the city and in rural Aleppo, reportedly resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people, including children, women and the elderly. Analysis of satellite imagery by Human Rights Watch shows that there was continued heavy air and ground bombardment by Government forces on opposition-held districts in the city of Aleppo from 6 June to 14 July 2014 with at least 130 major damage sites across many districts in the city. Most of the major damage sites identified by Human Rights Watch are consistent with air strikes, specifically the impact of barrel bombs dropped from helicopters, with the heaviest

[1] On 30 May 2013, the Islamic State, formerly the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), and Jabhat al-Nusra were designated as terrorist groups by the Security Council under resolution 1267 (1999). These two groups operate in the Syrian Arab Republic.

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concentrations in the residential districts of Rasafeh, Hanano, Sheikh Said, Haydariyeh, Sakhur, Tareeq al-Bab and Dahret Awwad. At the same time, indiscriminate shelling by armed opposition groups has intensified in Government-held areas of Aleppo city. For example, on 8 July, at least 10 mortar shells and domestic-made shells (gas cylinders known as "hell cannons") landed on Government-held areas in Al-Midan, Al-Aziziyeh, Al-Ashrafiyeh and Al-Neil areas, killing and injuring civilians and causing significant damage.

5. In Dar'a Governorate, barrel bombs were used on opposition-held areas, including the Old City of Dar'a, Ankhel and Nawa. On 16 July, two bombs exploded in the middle of a Palestinian refugee camp in Dar'a, killing nine Palestine refugees and three other people, and injuring several others. On 29 June, in Idlib Governorate, Government airstrikes on Salquin town and Kafr Nubul resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians.

6. Government-controlled cities and towns continued to be subject to indiscriminate mortar attacks, shelling and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices by armed opposition groups and extremists, notably the cities of Homs, Damascus, Rural Damascus and Hama. One attack in a suburb of Hama city killed at least 34 people on 20 June; another killed at least 15 people in Al-Shouq in Rural Damascus; while six people were killed in the Wadi al-Dahab area of Homs. On 19 July, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device exploded in Douma, in a densely populated area, killing at least 22 people and injuring more than 50. In Damascus, indiscriminate shelling by armed opposition groups and extremists intensified from 11 to 17 July, resulting in civilian casualties. For example, on 16 July, shelling resulted in the deaths of four people and injured 22 people in the Al-Shaalan neighbourhood.

7. All parties to the conflict are increasingly targeting vital services resulting in interruptions to the supply of safe drinking water and electricity. This is compounding the already dire water, sanitation and health conditions in conflict areas and resulting in an increased risk of outbreaks of waterborne diseases. In Aleppo city, damage caused to the main water pumping station by opposition groups on 2 June continues to limit water to approximately 2.5 million people, almost 1 million of whom require urgent assistance. Negotiations to access the water pumping station to conduct repairs and provide fuel have been ongoing since 2 June. On 19 July, repairs to the damaged water network began after technicians were allowed access to the site. Repairs are expected to be completed in a month. As at 23 June, power supply in Idlib city has been intermittent, owing to cuts by armed opposition groups in rural areas housing the electric cables. This has resulted in reduced availability of water supply to the city.

8. The Islamic State declared an Islamic Caliphate on 29 June, stretching from Aleppo Governorate to Diyala Governorate in eastern Iraq. This area has an estimated population of up to 7 million people. Fighting intensified in the Syrian Arab Republic between the Islamic State and the Government and armed opposition groups in Deir ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and the Kurdish areas of northern Aleppo Governorate, resulting in the displacement of a total of 250,000 people.

9. Recent developments in the Ninewa Governorate of Iraq have resulted in displacement to the north-eastern parts of the country and insecurity in areas along the Syrian-Iraqi borders. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has started the registration of an estimated 3,000 newly arrived

Iraqi refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic, while an estimated 1,000 Syrians previously seeking refuge in Iraq have crossed back into the eastern part of the country. Estimates indicate that hundreds of Syrians are returning to the Syrian Arab Republic on a daily basis.

10. While the United Nations does not have the means to independently verify their number and origins, non-Syrian fighters from a number of countries are increasingly participating in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic, supporting all sides of the conflict, including designated terrorist groups. On 29 June, the Islamic State issued a statement announcing that the Caliphate included people of the following nationalities: Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami (Levantine), Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, North African, American, French, German and Australian. Non-Syrian fighters also continue to support Syrian Government forces, with reports of Lebanese Hizbullah fighters operating with Government forces in Aleppo, Dar'a and Damascus Governorates. Unverified reports indicate that a number of Shia Iraqi militia, who fought in support of Syrian Government forces, mainly in Rural Damascus, have returned to Iraq, to repel the recent advances of the Islamic State in the country.

11. There are a number of ongoing negotiations on ceasefire agreements between the Government and armed opposition groups, including in Yarmouk, Homs and Dar'a. In Yarmouk, an agreement on cessation of hostilities was reached between Syrian authorities and armed opposition groups on 21 June. However, reports indicate that the agreement has not yet been fully implemented and that further negotiations are ongoing. In Homs, negotiations on a ceasefire are continuing in the Al-Wa'er neighbourhood. A ceasefire started in Al-Wa'er on 26 June but was breached on 29 June following reports of shelling. In Dar'a, negotiations on a ceasefire are under way in the Dar'a al-Balad area, including with Jabhat al-Nusra.

12. On 22 June, firing into the Israeli-occupied Golan resulted in the death of an Israeli teenager and injured three others. The Israel Defense Forces fired several rounds of tank fire and conducted air strikes in the early hours the following day. No personnel of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) were affected.

B. Human rights

13. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to receive reports of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and ill-treatment, allegedly perpetrated by members of the Syrian security apparatus. OHCHR received information indicating that at least seven detainees died as a result of torture in Government-run detention facilities, including at the Military Intelligence Branch in Damascus and the Political Security Branch in Hama. Meanwhile, OHCHR received reports that from 18 to 22 June at least 12 civilians were taken by security forces from their homes in the Salamiyah district of Hama, with no reason given for their detention. The Government has yet to put in place a mechanism to investigate serious and credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment.

14. In Homs, OHCHR received reports that over 100 detained evacuees from Old Homs are being held in different locations in Homs following their transfer from Al-Andalus school. OHCHR received reports that some of those evacuees were

tortured and ill-treated during their interrogation by members of the security branches at the Al-Andalus school facility. Around 29 families and 40 men currently remain at the facility, who are unable to leave as they lack documentation or who choose to stay because of insecurity in their area of origin.

15. As at 7 July, the fate of at least 200 prisoners and detainees from Aleppo Central Prison remains unknown. On 25 June, OHCHR sent a note verbale to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the status of those detainees, but no reply had been received as at 16 July. Information obtained by OHCHR indicates that conditions in makeshift places of detention, such as Al-Wahda School where prisoners from Aleppo Central Prison were transferred in May 2014, continue to be overcrowded and inhumane.

16. Children continue to be severely affected by the conflict. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, armed opposition groups, including the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, and the People's Protection Units have been recruiting and using children under 18 in combat and in direct support roles. However, some armed groups have taken steps to end the use of children in the conflict. On 5 July, the People's Protection Units, the Women's Protection Units and the Democratic Self-Administration in Rojava demobilized 149 children from their ranks and signed the Deed of Commitment protecting children in armed conflict developed by the non-governmental organization Geneva Call.

17. On 29 June, while returning home from school, four girls were killed and four other children were injured when mortars landed in front of a secondary school in Ar-Rastan in Rural Homs. Meanwhile, as at 14 July, around 130 of the 153 students abducted by the Islamic State on 29 May in Ain al-Arab continue to be held by the group.

18. The Government stated that 1,205 individuals were pardoned between 3 and 16 July following Legislative Decree 22 of 9 June 2014. According to reports, the Governor of Homs stated that 118 men detained at the Al-Andalus school facility were pardoned. However, OHCHR has not been able to verify the information.

19. OHCHR was informed that the Islamic State continue to hold approximately 250 civilians, including approximately 160 migrant workers, who were abducted some six months ago when returning to Kobani/Ain al-Arab from Iraq. OHCHR also received reports of a massacre on 9 July in the rural town of Khattab in Hama Governorate, during which 14 civilians were reportedly killed by unknown armed men.

20. On 27 June, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 26/23 on the continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, in which it demanded, inter alia, an end to the violence, including the demilitarization of medical facilities and schools, and full cooperation by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. On 4 July, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women considered the second periodic report of the Syrian Arab Republic (CEDAW/C/SYR/2), noting a range of human rights challenges and violations facing women and girls in the country.

21. Members of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, OHCHR, and United Nations human rights mechanisms, including

special procedures mandate holders, continued to be denied access to the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period.

C. Humanitarian access

22. Approximately 10.8 million people continue to be in need of urgent humanitarian assistance within the Syrian Arab Republic, including more than 6.4 million people who are internally displaced. It is now estimated that 4.7 million people reside in areas that are hard to reach. This includes at least 241,000 people who continue to live in areas that are besieged by either Government or opposition forces.

23. Insecurity and challenges with implementing the new truck sealing procedure, put in place by the Government, continue to affect sustainable delivery of aid. Intense negotiations by the United Nations with the Government continued during the reporting period to resolve these issues. In June, food deliveries continued to be fewer than in the first quarter of the year, reaching only 81 per cent of the target — compared to 97 per cent in March. However, thanks to some progress in negotiations, food deliveries started to increase in July. By 15 July, the World Food Programme (WFP) had dispatched food rations for nearly 1.6 million people, an increase of approximately 15 and 10 per cent in comparison to the same period in May and June, respectively.

24. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to hard-to-reach areas remains extremely difficult in view of the new procedures which have centralized approvals. Overall, assistance reached only 49 (or 17 per cent) of the 287 locations identified as besieged or hard to reach. The number of people reached in hard-to-reach locations has dropped since the last reporting period. Food assistance by WFP and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reached 95,838 people in 14 hard-to-reach locations during the reporting period compared to 348,819 people during the previous reporting period. From 18 June to 21 July, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) delivered non-food items to 62,090 people in 29 hard-to-reach locations compared to 268,960 people during the previous reporting period.

25. During the reporting period, armed opposition groups and designated terrorist groups have severely constrained access to the eastern governorates. Deir ez-Zor continues to suffer from severe access constraints as a result of the Islamic State's efforts to block humanitarian and commercial access into the Governorate from Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and the southern desert region — areas in which the Islamic State control all major access routes. Some 711,000 civilians are estimated to be affected. Similarly, in Ar-Raqqa, the Islamic State and armed opposition groups are blocking humanitarian and commercial access to areas that are under the control of others. As a result, access to Al-Hasakeh is also constrained.

26. During the reporting period, United Nations agencies and partners continued their efforts to deliver assistance to those in need. In June, WFP dispatched food for over 3.4 million people across 13 of the 14 governorates. Deliveries of chlorine by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) benefited 16.5 million people with clean water. In order to address the water crisis in Aleppo, UNICEF provided water trucking services and fuel for water stations in partnership with non-governmental organizations, the municipalities and the Aleppo Water Authority. From 18 June to

8 July, UNHCR dispatched core relief items to 243,222 people, many displaced from hard-to-reach areas. The World Health Organization (WHO) delivered medical assistance to over 2.1 million people.

27. In a note verbale dated 14 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested United Nations agencies to send humanitarian assistance to Adra Ummaleya and Adra al-Balad, in Rural Damascus, as those areas have not received assistance from the United Nations for more than six months.

Besieged areas

28. Approximately 241,000 people remain besieged — 196,000 in areas that are besieged by Government forces in Madamiyet Elsham, Eastern Ghouta, Darayya and Yarmouk, and 45,000 in areas besieged by opposition forces in Nubul and Zahra.

29. During the reporting period, assistance reached only two besieged communities, Yarmouk and Madamiyet Elsham. Food was distributed to 42,084 people, or 17.4 per cent, and non-food items to 20,000 people, or 8.2 per cent of people in besieged areas.

30. Eastern Ghouta: 150,000 people remain besieged in Eastern Ghouta. A convoy request was submitted for Douma on 9 July for 14 to 16 July targeting 50,000 people. No response has been received from the Government. Eastern Ghouta (Douma) was last reached with humanitarian assistance on 24 May.

31. Madamiyet Elsham: as a result of new arrivals from Darayya, the population has increased from 20,000 to 24,000 in the city. Although a local ceasefire is still holding, civilians inside the city are facing a shortage of basic needs and movement constraints. After intense negotiations, with 20 requests submitted for access to the area since March 2013, an inter-agency team was able to access the town with supplies on 14 July. It was originally scheduled for 9 and 10 July but faced delays because of extensive negotiations on the type of supplies, quantities, procedures to move the trucks and additional screening and processing imposed. From 14 to 21 July, seven convoys have proceeded, providing supplies for a total of 30,000 people — 20,000 inside the besieged area of Madamiyet and 10,000 in Government-held areas of the town. No medical supplies, including primary health-care kits for children, were allowed on the convoy in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. However, two mobile clinics of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) accessed the area and provided medical services and 1,000 doses of vaccines (polio and regular immunization) on 15, 16, 17 and 21 July. The health situation remains critical as there is only one health centre in the area and severe shortages of medicines.

32. Darayya: approximately 4,000 people remain besieged in Darayya, Rural Damascus, with no access to assistance during the reporting period. Owing to an increase in hostilities, an estimated 4,000 people have fled Darayya to Madamyiet Elsham which is adjacent. Darayya was last assisted in October 2012.

33. Yarmouk: 18,000 people remain besieged in Yarmouk. UNRWA accessed Yarmouk from 7 to 13 July and from 16 to 19 July, reaching 22,084 people with food parcels, after more than a month of interruption following its food distribution on 23 May and its distribution of non-food items on 7 June. Distributions remain insufficient to cover the minimum food needs of the civilian population in Yarmouk.

Three thousand doses of polio vaccine and a range of smaller items were also delivered on 16 July, including baby hygiene kits, rehydration salts, vitamins and lice treatments. In response to unconfirmed reports of approximately 100 typhoid cases on 18 July, UNRWA medical staff initiated an immediate investigation and were permitted to take blood samples from 12 patients, 4 of whom tested positive for typhoid. On 19 July, UNRWA transferred typhoid medicines comprising a range of antibiotics, syrups, tablets and injections to the Palestine Red Crescent Society, sufficient for approximately 100 patients, for treatment of patients inside Yarmouk. Water purification tablets were also provided.

34. Nubul and Zahra: 45,000 people remain besieged by opposition forces in Nubul and Zahra. Nubul and Zahra were targeted by domestic-made rockets on 9 July causing an unspecified number of casualties. No humanitarian assistance has reached the two villages since 8 May.

Cross-border assistance

35. On 14 July, the Security Council, by resolution 2165 (2014), authorized United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to use additional border crossings for delivery of humanitarian assistance: Bab al-Salam and Bab al-Hawa with Turkey, Al-Yarubiyah with Iraq and Al-Ramtha with Jordan. The Council established a mechanism to monitor the loading of all humanitarian relief consignments of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners at the relevant United Nations facilities with notification to the Syrian authorities.

36. Since the adoption of the resolution, the United Nations has conducted preliminary consultations and scoping to set up the monitoring mechanism, deploy staff, identify loading points and prepare convoys to reach areas through the four additional border crossings, as part of its whole of approach to the Syrian Arab Republic.

37. Relief items are urgently needed in Qamishly because of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Al-Hasakeh Governorate. On 9 July, UNHCR commenced airlifts from Damascus to Qamishly to transport 10,000 non-food item kits, sufficient for approximately 50,000 people, to provide assistance to people in hard-to-reach areas in Al-Hasakeh Governorate. Joint airlifts led by WFP from Damascus to Qamishly to transport food for over 50,000 people as well as water, sanitation and hygiene items and medicines are scheduled to commence shortly.

Free passage of medical supplies, personnel and equipment

38. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic continues to deny approvals of injectable medicines and surgical equipment destined for hard-to-reach areas in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. In some cases, the Government has denied the inclusion of any medical aid, such as in Madamiyet Elsham. This has resulted in denying supplies and the pre-positioning of life-saving treatment for six months for 24,000 people. During the inter-agency convoy to Madamiyet, two SARC mobile clinics were unable to carry any critical medicines for treatment of medical cases.

39. During the reporting period, WHO delivered medicines and medical equipment for 2.1 million people in nine governorates (Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa,

Damascus, Dara'a, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra and Rural Damascus). This included treatments[2] for 412,049 people in opposition-controlled areas in Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa, where medicines and supplies for 344,363 people were delivered to health authorities and are currently being distributed. Further treatments for around 1.1 million people have been provided to health authorities in governorates for further distribution, predominantly to Government-controlled areas; and treatments for 439,250 people are pre-positioned with SARC for distribution through partners and inter-agency convoys.

40. The seventh countrywide vaccination campaign for polio was conducted from 15 to 19 June. The latest campaign reached 2.7 million children across the country, including children in contested and hard-to-reach areas.

41. There are now 389 confirmed measles cases out of more than 2,800 suspected cases in the Syrian Arab Republic. Most of the cases are found in the hard-to-reach Governorates of Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa. UNICEF and WHO supported a Ministry of Health-led campaign from 15 to 26 June which aimed to reach up to 1 million children aged between 6 months and 10 years in high-risk areas. Preliminary figures from the campaign show that around 746,279 children were reached. The measles campaign, including provision of vitamin A, was conducted in all 14 governorates, including Deir ez-Zor (123,144), Aleppo (88,773) and Al-Hasakeh (83,539).

42. Attacks on medical facilities have significantly increased over the reporting period. During the month of June, Physicians for Human Rights documented 12 attacks on medical facilities. This is the second highest number of facility attacks recorded in a single month since December 2012. The attacks occurred in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Rural Damascus Governorates. All 12 documented attacks were committed by Government forces. The deaths of 19 medical personnel were also documented; 18 were committed by Government forces and one by an armed opposition group.

Administrative procedures

43. The implementation of the new procedure for the sealing of trucks intended to facilitate passage at checkpoints continued to slow down the delivery of humanitarian assistance. During the reporting period, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated that the new procedure for movement of relief supplies applied to regular programmes only and not to hard-to-reach areas.[3] The movement of supplies to hard-to-reach areas has to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis through meetings of the Joint Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and security personnel nationally. This directive is also applicable for authorization for hard-to-reach areas from United Nations hubs at the governorate level, which previously did not require authorization at the central/national level. In Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Idlib, the Governors have implemented the new directive and convoys are no longer authorized at hub level.

[2] One standard treatment course (e.g. a course of antibiotics for 8 days) is considered to be treatment for one person. Treatment courses are determined for each medicine distribution on the basis of international WHO standards.

[3] The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic refers to "hot spots". Clarification was requested by the United Nations on 16 July for the definition and criteria of hot spots but has not been received to date. For the purpose of this report, these are referred to as hard-to-reach areas until this is clarified, owing to the difficulty in reaching these locations.

WHO has received exemption from some of these procedures with respect to medicines, vaccines and some medical equipment.

44. On 18 June, UNHCR officially opened a field office in the city of As-Sweida to oversee its activities in the southern Syrian Arab Republic, in addition to establishing a logistics hub for humanitarian supplies arriving across the Syrian/Jordanian border. This will permit improved coverage of needs of internally displaced people in the Governorates of Dar'a, As-Sweida and Quneitra.

45. As at 18 July, a total of 68 visas or renewal requests remained pending: 29 within the 15 working day limit and 39 exceeding the 15 working day limit. Requested visas for the much-needed crop and food security assessment mission were granted for one week and only after crops had already been harvested, hampering the conduct of a credible and independent assessment. During the reporting period, there has been an increase in the number of pending visas for international non-governmental organizations, with 17 requests now pending, up from 13 during the last reporting period.

46. During the reporting period, there has been no change in the number of national non-governmental organizations authorized to partner with United Nations agencies: as at 17 July, 85 national non-governmental organizations are operating through 142 branches throughout the Syrian Arab Republic.

47. International non-governmental organizations continue to be unable to conduct independent (or joint) needs assessments; open sub-offices; monitor the impact of their work; and participate in inter-agency cross-line convoys.

Safety and security of staff and premises

48. On 5 July, a tank shell hit a vehicle in an UNDOF convoy, lightly wounding two peacekeepers. On 7 July, tank fire struck United Nations vehicles on patrol.

49. Twenty-eight United Nations national staff members continue to be detained or are missing: 27 from UNRWA are detained or presumed missing and one from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is detained. The total number of humanitarian workers killed since March 2011 is 59. This includes 14 United Nations staff members, 37 SARC staff members and volunteers, seven Palestine Red Crescent Society volunteers and staff members, and one staff member of an international non-governmental organization.

III. Observations

50. As I have made clear to the Security Council on many occasions, a political solution is urgently needed in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 10 July, I appointed Staffan de Mistura as my Special Envoy for the Syrian Arab Republic. Together with his deputy, Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy, he will work with Syrian parties, as well as with regional and international stakeholders, to identify new elements for a political process that brings an end to the violence and facilitates a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution, and that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people.

51. On 20 June, I set out six key areas for urgent action. First, bringing an end to the violence. I repeat my call for an arms embargo. Second, protecting the human

rights, safety and dignity of the Syrian people. Third, starting a serious political process for a new Syrian Arab Republic. Fourth, addressing the issue of accountability for the serious crimes committed by all sides. Fifth, completing the destruction of the chemical weapons production facilities. This has now been achieved. Sixth, the need to address the regional dimensions of the conflict, including the extremist threat.

52. Ways must be found to build bridges that promote peace and reconciliation, and to halt the influence of radical armed groups, including those affiliated with Al-Qaida. The world must come together to stop funding and other support for organizations designated as terrorist groups by the Security Council, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State.

53. This month, thousands of people were killed, displaced and traumatized by indiscriminate attacks by the parties to the conflict, including by the continuing use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Children continue to be killed, maimed and recruited by parties to the conflict. The Government continues to drop barrel bombs and carries out indiscriminate aerial bombardments in populated areas, with horrific consequences for Syrian women, children and men. The indiscriminate use of mortar and shelling of residential neighbourhoods by armed opposition groups is relentless. Human rights violations continue to be widespread, and attacks on medical facilities are on the increase in a blatant violation of international humanitarian law. Fundamental principles of humanity continue to be ignored every day. Deliberately targeting civilians is a war crime for which there can be no impunity.

54. The parties have continued to obstruct humanitarian assistance to those most in need and to withhold consent for operations in a completely arbitrary manner as a tactic of war. I call upon parties to the conflict to lift the sieges immediately and facilitate access to people in need of humanitarian assistance. I remind the parties to this conflict of their obligation to allow and facilitate access for humanitarian assistance, as demanded by the Security Council, by international humanitarian law, and by the most basic principles of humanity.

55. It is continuing violations that have led the Council to adopt resolution 2165 (2014), a resolution which should not have been necessary. Resolution 2165 (2014) makes four additional border crossings available to the United Nations and its implementing partners and could help humanitarian actors to reach up to 2.9 million more people, if security and other conditions allow. But this will be possible if, and only if, the parties to the conflict live up to their responsibilities to enable and facilitate access.

56. I call upon the parties to the conflict, in the strongest terms, to comply with the demands of the Council contained in resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014). This could make a meaningful difference in the lives of millions of people. But it will not replace the need for a political solution in the Syrian Arab Republic. No one is winning the Syrian war, and no one can win this conflict militarily. It is ordinary people who are paying the price for war and who crave a return to stability and security in their country.

Annex

1. Protection of civilians

Examples of attacks on civilian facilities (schools, hospitals, camps, places of worship)

Attacks on schools and hospitals during the reporting period

- On 19 June, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device went off near Maysaloun School in Al-Nuzha neighbourhood of Homs city; 11 civilians were killed and dozens injured.
- On 29 June, a mortar landed near Al-Sabaat secondary school, in Al-Rastan area of Rural Homs. Four young girls were killed and at least four children were injured.
- As at 18 July, around 130 students kidnapped by the Islamic State on 29 May in Ain al-Arab are still being held.

Large-scale impact of conflict on public services

- The conflict continued to disrupt health-care services. Hospitals have been damaged in 12 of the country's 14 governorates. Out of 97 Ministry of Health hospitals:

– 45 per cent are reported as fully functioning; 30 per cent are reported as partially functioning; and 25 per cent are reported as not functioning at all.

– 69 per cent are reported as accessible to patients seeking treatment, while 31 per cent are not accessible because of insecurity.

- Water production in Aleppo is reportedly at less than 50 per cent capacity following damage caused to water, sewage and electrical networks by an explosion on 2 June. As a result, an estimated 1 million people are reportedly facing difficulties in regularly accessing safe water supplies in the area. Access to repair the pumping station was secured on 19 July and repairs were started; they should be completed in one month.
- The Early Warning and Response System has reported over 1,650 cases of suspected typhoid in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, mostly in the towns of Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadin owing to the reported cuts in the water and electricity supply by the Islamic State on 8 June.
- On 1 July, there were two explosions close to the main police station in Khan Eshieh Palestine Refugee Camp, resulting in the death of at least one Palestine refugee, injuring seven, and causing significant material and structural damage.

2. Safe and unhindered humanitarian access to people in need

Hard-to-reach areas

- Latest estimates indicate that 4.7 million people are located in "hard-to-reach" areas and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

- Food assistance was provided to 95,838 people during the reporting period in hard-to-reach areas (73,754 by WFP and 22,084 by UNRWA).
- Non-food items were provided to 62,090 people in hard-to-reach areas. UNHCR provided 30,855 people with non-food assistance in hard-to-reach areas from 18 June to 8 July. Non-food items were also delivered to 20,000 people inside besieged Madamiyet Elsham and 10,000 people in the Government-held eastern part of Madamiyet Elsham town. The International Organization for Migration provided non-food items for 1,235 people.
- WHO distributed medicines and supplies for 364,363 people in hard-to-reach areas.
- UNICEF reached 24,755 people with water, sanitation and hygiene items and 24,220 children with educational support in hard-to-reach areas.
- Because of ongoing insecurity and the impact of new procedures for reaching hard-to-reach areas, there were no deliveries of health supplies by UNICEF, while UNFPA was unable to distribute any dignity kits or reproductive health commodities.

Inter-agency convoys

- There were five inter-agency convoys during the reporting period:
  - From 14 to 21 July, five inter-agency convoys reached Madamiyet Elsham and provided food, non-food items and hygiene supplies for 30,000 people in total (20,000 inside Madamiyet and 10,000 in Government-held areas of the town). No medical supplies were allowed on the convoy, including primary health-care kits for children; however, two SARC mobile clinics accessed the area and provided medical services and 1,000 doses of vaccines (polio and regular immunization) on 15, 16, 17 and 21 July.
- Six inter-agency convoys were requested but could not be sent during the reporting period:
  - On 15 July, the United Nations hub in Homs submitted a request for a cross-line convoy to Sahel Gahab (north-western Rural Hama), and requested follow-up for a pending inter-agency convoy request from 3 June. The convoys have yet to be approved.
    - An inter-agency convoy to Douma planned for 14 to 16 July could not be sent for lack of approval from authorities.
    - An inter-agency convoy to Abu al-Thohur, Idlib Governorate, planned for 29 June could not be sent for lack of approval from authorities. On 6 July, a reminder was sent to the Idlib Governor requesting approval for the convoy on 7 July. The Governor confirmed that the convoy should be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
    - In Homs, on 23 June, the Homs Governor informed the United Nations hub that cross-line convoys should be approved directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 15 July, the United Nations hub

submitted a request for a convoy to Al-Houla, which has yet to be answered.

- An inter-agency convoy to western Rural Hama requested on 4 June (with a reminder on 25 June) could not be sent for lack of approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- In Aleppo, the United Nations hub sent a request to the Governor's office on 15 June to continue the implementation of the Aleppo convoy plan, which had already been approved on 22 May. The Governor resubmitted the plan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but no response has been received.

- In a note verbale dated 14 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested United Nations agencies to send humanitarian assistance to Adra Ummaleya and Adra al-Balad, in Rural Damascus, as these areas have not received assistance from the United Nations for more than six months.

Besieged areas

- 241,000 people remain besieged in total.
- During the reporting period, food was distributed to 42,084 people, or 17.4 per cent, and non-food items to 20,000 people, or 8.2 per cent of people in besieged areas.
- UNRWA delivered food assistance to 22,084 people in Yarmouk Camp during the reporting period. UNRWA also delivered 3,000 polio vaccines for use inside Yarmouk.
- Food, non-food items and hygiene supplies were delivered to 20,000 people inside besieged Madamiyet Elsham.

Cross-border assistance

From Turkey

- According to the Turkish Red Crescent Society, humanitarian actors have channelled around US$ 23 million worth of humanitarian assistance on average per month from Turkey to the Syrian Arab Republic through the zero-point delivery system administered by the Turkish Red Crescent Society. This monthly average does not include assistance delivered via commercial or other channels.
- UNHCR submitted two requests for the importation of items from Turkey which were approved.

From Jordan

- UNHCR submitted 46 official requests to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for importation of core relief items across the Jordanian border. All were approved.
- On 24 June, following the opening of the new UNHCR office and logistics hub in As-Sweida, core relief items for 5,000 people were dispatched directly from the Jordanian border through to As-Sweida and then to hard-to-reach areas in Dara'a Governorate, without the need to pass through Damascus.

From Lebanon

- The Masna and Al-Arida border crossings between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic remained open for the transportation of relief items during the reporting period.
- UNHCR submitted 16 requests to import core relief items, medicines and telecommunications and security equipment across the Lebanese border; 13 were approved and 4, relating to telecommunications and security equipment, are pending.

From Iraq

- UNHCR submitted one request for the importation of items from Iraq which was approved.

Safety of humanitarian workers

- Syrian humanitarian workers continued to face a number of risks, including summary executions, kidnappings, arrests, violence and harassment. The number of humanitarian workers killed since March 2011 stands at 59, including 14 United Nations staff, 37 SARC staff and volunteers, seven Palestine Red Crescent Society volunteers and staff and one staff member of an international non-governmental organization (NGO).
- 28 United Nations national staff members continue to be detained or are missing (27 from UNRWA are detained or missing and one from UNDP is detained).

Declaration of commitment

- A total of 23 armed opposition groups have signed the Declaration of Commitment, affirming their core responsibilities under international humanitarian law and of their commitment to facilitate action to meet the needs of civilians on the basis of need alone. Of the 23 signatories, 14 groups signed during the reporting period:
  - Shuhada al-Badr/16th Division: signed 11 July
  - Liwa Suqur Jabal al-Zawiya: signed 4 July
  - Jabhat al-Sham: signed 4 July
  - Jabhat al-Haqq: signed 4 July
  - Jabhat Inqaz: signed 27 June
  - 13th Division: signed 26 June
  - Jabhat Tahreer al-Furat (Euphrates Liberation Front): signed 26 June
  - Jabhat Inqaz al-Thawra al-Islamiya (Front to save the Islamic Revolution): signed 26 June
  - Jabhat Syria lil Tahreer (Syrian Front for Liberation): signed 26 June
  - Jabhat Shaabialil Tahreer Syria (Popular Front for the Liberation of Syria): signed 26 June
  - 7th Division: signed 26 June

- Ahrar al-Shimal (Freeman of the North): signed 24 June
- Quwwat al-saiqa: signed 24 June
- Faylaq al-Sham/Al-Sham legion: signed 24 June

3. Safe passage of medical personnel and supplies

Attacks on medical facilities during the reporting period

- On 9 July, an airstrike shelled Dakkak Hospital in Aleppo city with two barrel bombs, causing damage to the hospital and resulting in death and injury to civilians.
- On 29 June, a medical facility in the besieged city of Jisreen in Eastern Ghouta was attacked, causing destruction to the medical facility and injuring several staff.
- On 29 June, the Orient Hospital in Kafranbel, Idlib, was attacked, killing two people and damaging the hospital.
- On 26 June, warplanes with missiles targeted medical facilities in Jisreen, Eastern Ghouta, resulting in destruction of the medical facility and severe injuries to the staff.
- On 24 June, two barrel bombs landed on Wesam Hospital in Kafarzeita, Rural Hama. The hospital was destroyed, one child was killed and the medical team was injured.
- On 24 June, the Daret Izzeh Surgical Hospital in western Rural Aleppo was targeted by warplanes resulting in the partial destruction of the hospital.
- On 23 and 24 June, a field hospital in Aleppo city supported by an international NGO was targeted by barrel bombs. Extensive damage was reported to infrastructure and life-saving equipment including oxygen and electric generators.
- On 23 June, a hospital in the Al-Sakhour area of Aleppo city was hit by barrel bombs, resulting in the destruction of the hospital.
- Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) documented 12 attacks on medical facilities in June. Four attacks were by barrel bombs, six by missiles or rockets, one by aerial bombardment, and one by shelling. Six attacks occurred in Aleppo Governorate, one in Hama Governorate, one in Homs Governorate, one in Idlib Governorate, and one in Rural Damascus Governorate. All 10 attacks were by Government forces. In total, PHR has documented 175 attacks on 143 separate medical facilities by the end of June 2014.
- Physicians for Human Rights documented that 19 medical personnel were killed during June; 18 were killed by Government forces and one by armed opposition groups. Overall, PHR have recorded the deaths of 526 medical personnel since the start of the conflict.

Removal of medicines and medical supplies from convoys

- Access to medical supplies and equipment continues to be hampered by insecurity and by constraints imposed on humanitarian operations by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. During the reporting period, medicines and medical equipment for approximately 24,000 people in hard-to-reach areas were unavailable because of lack of approval and removal of supplies.

    - 24,000 people were unable to receive six months' worth of medical and basic surgical supplies and critical supplies that had been readied by WHO for delivery as part of the five convoys to Madamiyet Elsham from 14 to 19 July.

Polio vaccination campaign

- As at 9 July 2014, there have been 36 confirmed cases of polio; 35 cases from October to December 2013, and one case in 2014. The confirmed cases were in Deir ez-Zor (25), Aleppo (5), Idlib (3), Al-Hasakeh (2) and Hama (1).
- During the polio vaccination round from 15 to 19 June, 2.7 million children were reached in all 14 governorates. Around 30 per cent of children were located in hard-to-reach areas.
- UNICEF provided 28.5 million doses of oral polio vaccine to the Government, which is the total amount needed to cover the polio response plan until September 2014. The next polio round will begin at the end of August and will be part of the Sub-National Immunization Days.

Measles vaccination campaign

- There are 389 confirmed measles cases in the Syrian Arab Republic to date, most registered in Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa. In addition, more than 2,800 cases of suspected measles have been reported through the early warning system, double the number reported for the whole of 2013.
- UNICEF and WHO supported a Ministry of Health-led measles vaccination campaign from 15 to 26 June, targeting up to 1 million children in high-risk areas. Preliminary results indicate that around 746,279 children were reached across all 14 governorates, including Deir ez-Zor (123,144), Aleppo (88,773) and Al-Hasakeh (83,539).
- UNICEF delivered 6.5 million doses of vitamin A to the Ministry of Health, which were used during the measles campaign and will also be used in the routine sessions of vaccinations.

4. Administrative hurdles

- On 9 June, the Ministry of Social Affairs communicated to governors that all convoys or missions to "hot spot areas"[a] required the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the High Relief Committee and the National Security Office. Previously, the governors were delegated to coordinate and authorize delivery of assistance within their respective governorates including across lines of conflict, in areas where hubs are approved. Delivery of assistance to cross-line locations has been significantly hampered throughout the reporting period as a result of the roll-out of this new directive.
- On 2 July, the Humanitarian Coordinator requested, in writing to the Government, clarification of the new procedures for the importation of goods issued on 29 May. The new procedures added administrative layers to the customs clearance process, including approval from the local governor and submission of weekly importation plans.
- On 7 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated a time frame for submitting the weekly loading plans according to the truck sealing procedures rolled out for the movement of trucks for regular programmes: loading plans are to be submitted by United Nations agencies on Monday each week during working hours. The Government has committed itself to clearing the weekly loading plans on Thursday, for distributions to start on Saturdays.
- WHO has received exemption from some of these procedures with respect to medicines, vaccines and some medical equipment.

Clearance procedures for telecommunications equipment

- Government approvals to import and operate information and communications technology equipment remain a lengthy process. UNHCR obtained approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for VHF radios (at the customs awaiting clearance), VSATs for Qamishly and Damascus (at Damascus airport customs awaiting clearance), and ProGres servers/laptops (soon to be shipped to Damascus). The import permit is still pending approval from Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a VSAT for Aleppo and CISCO telephony system.

Empowered interlocutors

- *Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*. The joint United Nations and Government of the Syrian Arab Republic Committee established following the adoption of resolution 2139 (2014) includes a security focal point. Regular meetings are held between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Humanitarian Coordinator on an almost daily basis. The Committee includes a security focal point.
- *Opposition*. The opposition is still unable to designate empowered interlocutors. The fragmented nature of the opposition makes it difficult to clearly identify an interlocutor for armed opposition groups.

[a] The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic refers to "hot spots". Clarification was requested by the United Nations on 16 July for the definition and criteria of hot spots but has to date not been received. For the purpose of this report, these are referred to as hard-to-reach areas until this has been clarified, owing to the difficulty in reaching these locations.

- *Ad hoc* local engagement is ongoing to negotiate access. Interlocutors vary depending on the localities where access is being negotiated.

Visas

- The revised visa policy established by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 4 March continued to be implemented. As at 18 July, a total of 68 United Nations visas or renewal requests remain pending, 29 within the 15 working day limit and 39 exceeding the 15 working days. There has been an increase in the number of pending visas for international NGOs, with 17 requests now pending, up from 13 during the last reporting period.
- The six visas requested for the members of the crop and food security assessment mission from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and WFP were not obtained in a timely fashion. The mission originally intended a three-week period from 11 June to ensure adequate field crop observation. On 3 July 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted visas for a one-week mission and valid only until 20 July. However, the proposed timing (during Ramadan and after the harvesting of crops) hampers the conduct of a credible and independent assessment.

Humanitarian hubs and presence

- On 18 June, UNHCR officially opened a field office in As-Sweida to oversee UNHCR operational activities in the south, in addition to establishing a logistics hub for humanitarian supplies arriving across the Syrian/Jordanian border.
- The Aleppo hub is still being operationalized and is currently staffed with international and national staff. Further progress has been made in establishing a UNICEF office in Aleppo, with the recruitment of new staff under way.

International non-governmental organization partners

- The number of international NGOs approved to work in the Syrian Arab Republic stands at 16; no new international NGOs requested approval to work in the country during the reporting period.
- International NGOs are still not authorized to work directly with national NGOs and are not allowed to accompany United Nations convoys to the field.
- There was no progress during the reporting period on the revision of the standard memorandum of understanding for international NGOs with SARC and line ministries.

National non-governmental organization partners

- The number of national NGOs authorized to partner stands at 85, operating through 142 branches.

5. Funding

- $27.2 million of funding for the Syrian crisis was registered during the reporting period. Of that amount, $10.9 million were for activities inside the

Syrian Arab Republic and $16.3 million were for support to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries.

- Of the total amount reported for the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period, 45 per cent ($4.9 million) was for activities included in the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan. For neighbouring countries, 89 per cent ($14.5 million) of the amount reported was for activities included in the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan.

- As at 21 July, the total funding for the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan stands at 33 per cent ($6.02 billion requested, $1.98 billion received). The Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan is 27 per cent funded and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan is 37 per cent funded.

6. Overview of United Nations humanitarian response

Food assistance

- During the June cycle, WFP dispatched food in support of over 3.4 million people across 13 of the 14 governorates, reaching 81 per cent of the planned 4.25 million people.

- The July food dispatch cycle started slowly but has since improved. As at 15 July, WFP has dispatched 316,210 family food rations in support of nearly 1.6 million people in 11 of 14 governorates, an increase of approximately 15 and 10 per cent in comparison to the same time in May and June, respectively.

Core relief items and shelter

- UNHCR dispatched core relief items for 243,222 vulnerable people during the reporting period. In total, over 2.5 million people have received core relief items in 13 out of the 14 governorates since the beginning of the year; approximately 9.1 million items have been distributed overall.

- So far in 2014, UNHCR has completed the rehabilitation of collective shelters in six governorates benefiting 8,207 people. Further, private shelters have been upgraded for 23,933 people in Homs, Rural Damascus and Aleppo Governorates.

- IOM delivered a total of 7,287 non-food items in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, As-Sweida, Homs, Idlib, Damascus and Hama Governorates.

Health

- During the reporting period, WHO delivered and/or dispatched medicines and medical equipment for over 2.1 million people in nine governorates (Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Damascus, Dara'a, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra and Rural Damascus). This included treatments for 412,049 people in opposition-controlled areas in Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa, where medicines and supplies for 344,363 people were delivered to health authorities and are currently being distributed. Further treatments for around 1.1 million people have been provided to health authorities in governorates for further distribution,

predominantly to Government-controlled areas; and treatments for 439,250 people are pre-positioned with SARC for distribution through partners and inter-agency convoys.

- 14,600 women received reproductive health services including emergency obstetric care and safe delivery through the UNFPA-assisted reproductive health clinics, vouchers, mobile teams and maternal hospitals in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs.

Nutrition

- Nutrition support was provided to over 36,000 children through WFP in collective shelters in Homs, Hama and Tartous, while children in Aleppo and Al-Hasakeh received nutributter to address micronutrient deficiencies.

Water, sanitation and hygiene

- During the reporting period, UNICEF continued to reach 16.5 million people with access to safe water through the supply of sodium hypochlorite; 41 per cent of people assisted are in areas not controlled by the Government.
- UNICEF and partners continued to reach children and families in hard-to-reach areas with access to water, sanitation and hygiene services. In Al-Hasakeh Governorate, 11,790 people were reached with water, sanitation and hygiene supplies in collaboration with SARC and Al-Bir Association. In Ar-Raqqa, UNICEF supported 2,250 displaced people residing in camps in the Mansoura area with drinking water services in partnership with Al-Bir. Meanwhile, agreements with two local NGOs will see water, sanitation and hygiene services provided to 22,000 displaced people at the Tishreen shelter and another 51 buildings.
- UNICEF supported immediate responses to address the water crisis in Aleppo including through water trucking services in partnership with NGOs, the municipality and the Aleppo Water Authority. UNICEF is also undertaking hygiene promotion activities among internally displaced persons and host communities living in the western part of Aleppo city.

Education

- Schools are currently closed in the Syrian Arab Republic and so current education activities are focused on preparation for the start of the next academic year in September.
- UNICEF, along with the Directorate of Education, distributed 8,235 school bags in Al-Hasakeh City.
- 15,745 children continued to have access to learning through 48 UNICEF-supported learning centres in Homs, Al-Rastan and surrounding areas.

Palestine refugees

- UNRWA provided food assistance to 22,084 people in Yarmouk Camp, health consultations for 77,357 people, cash assistance to 337,838 people, 422 microfinance loans and water, sanitation and hygiene/shelter support to 13,901 people.

- UNRWA participated in the WHO-led campaign to vaccinate or re-vaccinate all children in the Syrian Arab Republic, which covered 65 per cent of at-risk Palestine refugees. Vaccination rates among Palestine refugees relative to the Syrian population were high (99 per cent prior to the conflict).

Agriculture

- FAO provided agricultural support to 11,956 people overall, including in hard-to-reach areas: 3,346 people in Idlib and Hama Governorates received animal feed, 6,300 people in Hama were assisted with vegetable seed packages and 2,310 people in Rural Damascus received poultry production packages or animal feed.

Protection and community services

- UNHCR continued its protection monitoring activities through staff on the ground in seven key locations, 11 community centres, partnerships with international and local organizations, and more than 200 outreach volunteers. UNHCR conducted protection monitoring visits to Al-Andalus school facility, the shelter that housed individuals evacuated from the once besieged Old City of Homs.

- UNHCR and partners have provided 3,874 internally displaced persons with legal assistance related to personal status documentation and birth registration related issues since the start of 2014.

- UNICEF in collaboration with partners reached 7,832 children with psychosocial support in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Dar'a, Quneitra, Tartous, Lattakia, Hama and Homs Governorates. This included reaching 385 children in Al-Waer, Homs, in cooperation with the NGO Al-Aoun.

- UNFPA continues to provide gender-based violence support services through three centres in Damascus: 680 screening services (including for sexual violence) and 5,689 counselling services were delivered by UNFPA partners.

- UNHCR provides support to the approximately 35,000 registered refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic. As at 8 July, UNHCR had completed the initial registration of 622 Iraqis in Al-Hasakeh Governorate out of an estimated 3,000 Iraqi arrivals.

United Nations S/2014/526

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 July 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the Presidency of Rwanda, the Security Council is scheduled to hold a wrap-up session on the work of the Council in July 2014 and implementation of note S/2010/507, in the format of a public briefing.

The briefing will be held on Wednesday, 30 July 2014. In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, Rwanda has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Eugène-Richard **Gasana**

14-58249 (E) 240714

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Annex to the letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Wrap-up session on the work of the Security Council in July 2014 and implementation of note S/2010/507

Introduction

1. On Wednesday, 30 July 2014, the Security Council will hold a wrap-up session on its work during the month of July 2014, under the presidency of Rwanda. The wrap-up session will provide an opportunity for Council members to have an exchange of views on the situations addressed by the Council in July, as well as on its methods of work during that month. The purpose of the meeting is to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the work of the Council, in accordance with paragraph 1 of note S/2010/507.

Objectives

2. Rwanda considers that, on the basis of the positive feedback from non-Council members, an interactive wrap-up session would be useful for the membership of the United Nations and the larger public to better understand the work of the Council. It is important for all Members of the United Nations to be well apprised of that work, as we recall that, under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is the general membership of the United Nations that confers on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. We also consider that such a session would be of value to the Council itself and enable it to critically examine its progress on issues, its processes and how it can increase its efficiency and effectiveness in addressing the situations before it. In that regard, particular attention shall be paid to the approach and effectiveness of the Council in dealing with the increasing number of country-specific situations that have emerged or worsened in the past weeks and months.

Format and participation

4. The wrap-up session will be a public briefing. Non-members of the Council are encouraged to attend the session.

Outline of proceedings

5. The presidency intends to make an introductory statement summarizing the work of the Council during the month of July 2014.

6. Council members will then be invited to make concise statements on the Council's work during the month. They are expected to provide, in their statements, an assessment of that work, as well as recommendations on how the Council could improve its efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in dealing with the current country-specific situations.

7. The President then intends to make his statement, in his national capacity, on the basis of the principles outlined above.

United Nations A/68/955–S/2014/527

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 23 July 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate annexes recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships during the month of June 2014 (see annex II). It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal Tympou airport. I have the honour to draw your attention to the systematic infringements by Turkey of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus through blatant violations of international law, in a way that seriously jeopardizes safety and security in the greater region.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Menelaos **Menelaou**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

14-58345 (E) 040814

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Annex I to the letter dated 23 July 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 June	0747-0855	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
	0955-1150	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1350-1443	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 June	1352-1504	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1657-1920	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1730-1920	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2023-2151	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
4 June	1116-1135	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1645-1750	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1705-1723	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
5 June	1004-1055	Two C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1402-1552	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2029-2145	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 June	1233-1340	One KC-135 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1304-1340	Five F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1639-1713	Two C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
8 June	1022-1102	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1207-1412	One AB-412 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1610-1640	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1623-1735	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
9 June	1122-1141	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1137-1157	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1245-1323	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1337-1354	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
	1340-1354	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
11 June	1418-1442	One GLF-4 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1502-1950	One AB-412 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1644-1920	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from and again landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1725-1929	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1725-2140	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
12 June	1113-1133	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1113-1136	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1229-1327	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1315-1337	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
	1324-1435	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1416-1433	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
	1808-1828	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
13 June	0249-0309	One GLF-4 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 June	1136-1156	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1143-1200	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1354-1413	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, departing from the illegal Tympou airport.
	1405-1424	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.
16 June	1420-1631	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
17 June	1403-1425	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
19 June	1145-1200	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1729-1747	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.
24 June	0950-1130	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1416-1545	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
25 June	1447-1618	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
26 June	1419-1621	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1457-1522	Four F-4 and six F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
27 June	0843-1017	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0859-1030	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1137-1202	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1827-1920	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 23 July 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
26 May-30 June	One Turkish research/survey vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
8-12 June	One F-492 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
8-12 June	One SG-702 Turkish search and rescue vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
9-12 June	One F-502 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
9-12 June	One P-1211 Turkish patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
14-16 June	One S-347 Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.

United Nations S/2014/528

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 July 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 21 July 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to Security Council resolution 2157 (2014) of 29 May 2014, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) for a period of six months, from 1 June until 30 November 2014. I have taken note of the request of the Council that I conduct a comprehensive review of the mandate of UNIOGBIS to ensure that it is aligned with the priorities identified by the Government and report on the findings of such a review by 30 October 2014.

I am, however, concerned that the deployment of an assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau within the next few weeks to meet the 30 October 2014 deadline may be premature given that the new Government will require time to identify, through a process of inclusive consultations, its long-term national priorities. I would therefore request that the Council give consideration to granting an extension of three months for the submission of my report. This would give the Government the time needed to settle into its new role, to collaboratively define its key priorities and to consult with representatives of my assessment mission on how best to align the mandate of UNIOGBIS with its priorities.

I would be grateful if the Security Council could give consideration to my request.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2014/529

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 July 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 23 July 2014 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 21 July 2014 (S/2014/528) concerning your report pursuant to resolution 2157 (2014) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Council have taken note of the request contained in your letter that the time frame for the issuance of the report be extended by a period of three months, but they would in turn request that you provide a written update by 12 November 2014, which the Council could consider prior to the expiration of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau on 30 November 2014.

(*Signed*) Eugène-Richard **Gasana**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations A/ES-10/644–S/2014/530

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 24 July 2014 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

In less than 24 hours since my letter to you yesterday, more than 120 Palestinians, including 10 members of one family, have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces. The death toll now stands at more than 790 Palestinians killed, the majority of them children and women, and more than 5,000 persons injured, as Israel, the occupying Power, continues its bloody aggression against the Palestinian civilian population in the besieged Gaza Strip.

Today, Israel, the occupying Power, proved yet again its absolute disregard for human life and the rules of international humanitarian law intended to prevent such military assaults against civilians. Once again, the Israeli occupying forces have targeted a school of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), causing more deaths and injuries among already-traumatized civilians displaced from their homes and sheltering in the school, including many who were demanded by the occupying Power in earlier days to leave their residential areas. It is imperative to recall that during Israel's 2008-2009 war on Gaza, Israeli tanks shelled an area outside an UNRWA school in Jabaliya refugee camp, killing 42 people and injuring dozens, a crime in which the occupying Power deliberately targeted areas and buildings housing the largest number of civilians, but for which Israel has never been held accountable.

Witnesses have reported that Israeli artillery shelling hit the school in Beit Hanoun in broad daylight. This attack on a clearly marked United Nations installation, for which the occupying Power had the exact coordinates and information that the school was sheltering civilians, resulted in the killing of at least 17 Palestinians and injuries to more than 200 displaced persons sheltering there. This is the fourth time in two days that Israeli occupying forces have bombed schools serving as shelters in the besieged Gaza Strip; those incidents include the firing on a girls' school in Maghazi refugee camp, where hundreds of displaced

14-58342 (E) 300714

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Palestinians had been sheltering. In this regard, at the time of writing of this letter, more than 148,000 Palestinians are sheltering in UNRWA schools in Gaza, seeking safety from Israel's military onslaught and suffering from the dire humanitarian circumstances.

We strongly condemn Israel's attack on the UNRWA school in Beit Hanoun and the killing of innocent civilians, who believed that they and their children would be safe under the United Nations flag. We demand an immediate, impartial and thorough investigation into this grave incident in order to establish accountability and bring the perpetrators of this crime to justice. Such grave breaches of international humanitarian law and such gross violations of the inviolability of United Nations premises must not remain unpunished.

As the list of Israeli crimes grows by the minute, I am compelled to share some of the horrifying details emerging from Gaza under Israel's assault since our last letter to you. It must be borne in mind that this does not represent an exhaustive list of the crimes being deliberately perpetrated by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people at the present moment:

- Israeli occupying forces killed at least 10 members of the Al-Astal family, including three children — Amin Tha'er Al-Astal (age 3), Nada Tha'er Al-Astal (age 5) and Mohammed Ismail Al-Astal (age 17) — in two separate attacks on civilian homes in Khan Younis in southern Gaza.
- Israeli occupying forces killed five members of the Abu Aita family, including an 11-year-old boy in Jabaliya in northern Gaza. Among the dead were Ibrahim Abdullah Abu Aita (age 67), Jamila Salim Abu Aita (age 65), Ahmad Ibrahim Abdullah Abu Aita (age 30) and Adham Ahmad Abu Aita (age 11).
- Israeli occupying forces targeted a motorbike with a missile from a warplane in 'Absan to the east of Khan Younis, killing four Palestinians, including a child, Baker Al-Najjar (age 13).
- Israeli occupying forces shelled 'Absan and Bani Suheila in Khan Younis district, killing seven Palestinians.
- Yazid Sa'ed Al-Batsh (age 23) succumbed to his wounds, tragically adding yet another member of the Al-Batsh family to the casualties resulting from Israeli shelling of their home on 14 July.
- Amir Adel Siyam (age 13) was among others who were killed by an Israeli raid on Rafah.
- Hadi Abdulhamid Abdulnabia (age 1) was killed in Jabaliya.
- In the farming village of Khuza'a, near Khan Younis, at least 25 civilians are believed dead and 16 wounded. Two thirds of the homes have been destroyed and 60 per cent of the population has fled, while the rest are prevented from leaving by ongoing attacks and sniper fire.
- Of the Palestinians killed, three were UNRWA staff: a 55-year-old woman who had served UNRWA for 20 years, who was killed in an attack on 20 July in which her husband and the youngest of her six daughters were injured; a 30-year-old UNRWA teacher, who was killed after fleeing the violence in Shuja'iya and as she was sheltering at her sister's home, which was bombed in an attack on 21 July that killed 10 other family members; and a 40-year-old

UNRWA teacher, who was killed on 23 July at the Zaitoun school emergency shelter, where he was assisting displaced Palestinians.

- As medical facilities continue to be targeted by the occupying forces, at least three hospitals have now been forced to evacuate their patients following Israeli strikes, causing overcrowding in other hospitals, such as Nasser hospital in Khan Younis, which is struggling to cope. In addition, the depletion of essential medicines and medical supplies has reached critical levels.

Even though international and regional efforts continue in the region, the international community is duty-bound to take the measures necessary to bring an immediate end to this Israeli military onslaught against the defenceless Palestinian civilian population in Gaza. Too many innocent lives have been lost to this barbaric, inhumane aggression. Moreover, the international community must exert the pressure necessary to compel the occupying Power to lift the illegal blockade, by which it has wilfully inflicted a humanitarian disaster in Gaza for more than eight years, affecting every single man, woman and child and every single dimension of life.

With regard to international efforts, we note and welcome the convening of the special session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which was held yesterday, 23 July, in Geneva, and at which the Council adopted a resolution in which it decided to establish an independent, international commission of inquiry to investigate all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

We wish to highlight the statement made before the Human Rights Council by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, in which she expressed deep concern over possible Israeli "war crimes" in Gaza and said that:

> A number of incidents, along with the high number of civilian deaths, belies the claim that all necessary precautions are being taken. ... People — particularly the elderly, sick and those with disabilities — are not given sufficient time to scramble out of their homes. When they do manage to run out into the street, there is nowhere to hide and no way of knowing where the next shell or missile will land.

We remain persistent and relentless in our call on the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities and exert all efforts to bring about an immediate, durable ceasefire, put an end to the illegal eight-year blockade and provide protection for the Palestinian people. Every moment that this remains elusive means the deaths of scores of Palestinians, the destruction of more Palestinian civilian infrastructure, a worsening in the already dire humanitarian situation and the deepening of wounds and the intensification of rage among generations of Palestinians. This tragedy underscores, yet again, the need for urgent and serious efforts by all concerned to address the underlying causes of this crisis and the root causes of the conflict as a whole, if the international community truly ever wants to achieve an end to this conflict, which is the source of such great instability and turmoil, and a just and lasting peace among the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.

This letter is in follow-up to our 510 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000

(A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 23 July 2014 (A/ES-10/643-S/2014/519) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/531

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011), 2074 (2012) and 2123 (2013), I have the honour to convey the attached letter dated 14 July 2014, which I received from H.E. Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, transmitting the thirty-seventh report on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex). The report covers the period from 1 December 2013 to 28 February 2014.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 14 July 2014 from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011), 2074 (2012) and 2123 (2013), please find enclosed the thirty-seventh three-monthly report on Operation Althea to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Catherine **Ashton**

Enclosure

Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Introduction

1. The present report covers the period from 1 December 2013 to 28 February 2014.

2. In its resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011), 2074 (2012) and 2123 (2013), the Security Council requested that Member States, acting through or in cooperation with the European Union, report to the Council on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) at least at three-monthly intervals. This is the thirty-seventh such report.

II. Political background

3. During the reporting period, ethnocentric politics and narrow party interests continued to dominate the public agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political polarization deepened and further weakened the efficiency and functionality of public institutions to the detriment of the reform agenda. Inflammatory nationalist rhetoric also continued. As Bosnia and Herzegovina entered its 2014 general elections year, political parties focused more and more on electoral calculations, thus further reducing the scope for progress on the Euro-Atlantic integration process.

4. In January 2014, the protracted political blockade in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina endangered the fiscal stability of the country. The institutions did ultimately provide a temporary solution, which allowed for the continued implementation of the standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund and the disbursement of funds critical for the fiscal sustainability of the country. The pre-election dynamic in Republika Srpska also reverberated at the state level, where the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was pushed out of the state level coalition.

5. In February 2014, public protests shook the political and social fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The protests started in the town of Tuzla, and spread to several other cities, with calls to improve the dismal social and economic situation and to address deficiencies in the area of rule of law. At the peak of the protests there were outbursts of violence in some places. There was concern regarding possible ethnic spillover. The protests led to some hundred injured among protestors and police and to significant damages to public property, including to the building of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four out of 10 cantonal governments in the Federation resigned under public pressure.

6. While the public protests progressively faded away, the civil society remains active, including through the work of "plenums", the new form of informal public organization, which appeared in the context of the protests. The plenums in the cities of Sarajevo and Tuzla have established their formal demands, which have been acknowledged by the cantonal authorities. However, senior leaders in Bosnia

and Herzegovina have yet to demonstrate willingness to engage with the demands of the population.

7. The European Union Foreign Affairs Council discussed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 10 February and adopted substantial conclusions in April.

8. During the reporting period, political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to fail to come to an agreement on the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci ruling of the European Court of Human Rights. On 17 February 2014, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, announced that he would no longer facilitate among the Bosnia and Herzegovina party leaders on this issue, but would redirect efforts towards improving economic governance, the rule of law and the implementation of European Union-funded projects through the Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA) programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9. No tangible progress was noted in fulfilling the condition for the activation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership action plan: a technical requirement that has been blocked by political division. The annual ammunition and explosives disposal rate remained unsatisfactory. While technical groundwork is being laid to increase disposal rate in the near future, bottlenecks still need to be overcome to increase the actual disposal rate.

10. The comprehensive approach, promoted by the reinforced European Union presence on the ground, and the increased cooperation during the February crisis between the European Union Special Representative and Operation Althea consolidated, strengthened and validated the European Union engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Union and European Union-related issues dominated the political and public agenda.

III. Security situation and EUFOR activities

11. The overall security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained relatively calm except for in February 2014, when serious violence broke out in some places, which accompanied otherwise peaceful and legitimate demonstrations. Whereas these violent incidents at the end of the reporting period threatened the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, military support was not necessary to maintain the safe and secure environment.

12. Law enforcement agencies did not respond to the protests and violence in February effectively and in a coordinated manner. Improved communication, cooperation and coordination among them would contribute to improved capacity to manage widespread public unrest.

13. Operation Althea continued its main effort in capacity-building and training, while retaining the means to support the efforts of the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining the safe and secure environment.

14. EUFOR has maintained its focus on developing and maintaining the ability to integrate reserves. The Intermediate Reserve concept was validated again through a level 2 Operational Rehearsal Quick Response and the successful embedding of two Intermediate Reserve companies into the Multinational Battalion during Operational Rehearsal Quick Response 2.3, as well as a level 1 Operational Rehearsal Quick

Response by Romania in 13 December. Of significance, on 14 February the notice-to-move period of two Intermediate Reserve companies (from Austria and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) was temporarily reduced to 24 hours owing to the civil unrest in several areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has been reverted to normal readiness.

15. In support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EUFOR continued to monitor and advise Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities within activities related to ammunition and weapons storage sites, the civilian and military movement of weapons and military equipment, the disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition and defence industry factories.

16. The progress of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in taking control and managing the ammunition, weapons and explosives surplus was encouraging. However, the Strategic Board kept deferring a number of key decisions, such as increasing the operational capacity of destruction or streamlining procedures for emergency destruction that would allow substantial progress to be made. Eventually, at the fourth Strategic Board meeting, the Minister of Defence committed to establish by 31 March 2014 a task force to further develop the Bosnia and Herzegovina ammunition, weapons and explosives masterplan.

17. In support of OSCE, EUFOR continued to contribute to the enhancement of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina capacity in ammunition, weapons and explosives handling and management. The Bosnia and Herzegovina-led Strategic and Coordination Committees provided an increased level of coordination, improved decision-making process and training of staff, thus laying the foundation for increased results in disposal in the near future. The ammunition, weapons and explosives annual disposal rate in 2013 remained at unsatisfactory level by approximately 1,000 tons, a slight improvement over 2012, but similar to 2011 figures.

IV. Outlook

18. The security situation remained relatively calm except for February 2014. Concerns exist that the socioeconomic environment continues to remain a serious problem, which may have the potential to lead to situations that could threaten the safe and secure environment.

19. Particularly during the electoral campaign, a close link between EUFOR and the Bosnia and Herzegovina law enforcement agencies will be crucial to assure an adequate situational awareness.

United Nations S/2014/532

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 July 2014

Original: English

Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea and Rwanda: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 2033 (2012) on the cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, and statements by its President underscoring the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union (AU), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant statutes of regional and subregional organizations,

Recalling its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recognizing that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, can improve collective security,

Reaffirming its commitment to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including its commitment and respect to the principles of political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States in conducting all peacekeeping activities and the need for States to comply with their obligations under international law,

Resolving to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and to ensure the effective functioning of the collective security system established by the Charter of the United Nations, and welcoming the 11 June 2014 announcement of the Secretary-General of a comprehensive review of United Nations peacekeeping activities,

Reaffirming that respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, is essential to the success of peacekeeping operations,

Recognizing that regional organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region, which can be a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of these conflicts, and acknowledging the efforts made by the African Union to review the scope of the African Standby Force (ASF), consistent with the recommendations of the 2013 independent Panel of Experts,

Recognizing the role that regional and subregional organizations can play in the protection of civilians, and in particular women and children affected by armed conflict, as well as in the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations and supports the critical role that women play in all peace and security efforts, including those to prevent and resolve conflict and mitigate its impact,

Recognizing the valuable contribution of relevant regional and subregional organizations and arrangements for the protection of children affected by armed conflict and commending the declaration signed on 17 September 2013 between the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission, in order to mainstream protection mechanisms in all peace and security activities of the African Union, in close partnership with UNICEF, as well as the European Union (EU) Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, including its Checklist for the integration of the protection of children affected by armed conflict into EU Common Security and Defence Policy operations,

Recognizing the role that regional and subregional organizations can play in post-conflict peacebuilding including security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), rule of law, recovery, reconstruction and development processes, and reaffirming the importance of interaction and cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and regional and subregional organizations and arrangements,

Stressing the utility of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, in order to enable early responses to disputes and emerging crises and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the prevention of conflict, and stressing that the coordination of efforts at the regional level may be necessary for the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure effective peacekeeping activities to address threats, to international peace and security,

Underlining the usefulness of sharing the experience of countries which have gone through conflict and post-conflict situations and comparable transitions, and emphasizes the importance of effective regional, South-South and triangular cooperation,

Welcoming the continuing efforts and enhanced peacekeeping role of regional and subregional organizations, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions and decisions, including in preparing the ground for United Nations peacekeeping operations and calling upon regional and subregional organizations to promote coherence and coordination of their peacekeeping efforts with those of the peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as with the wider United Nations presence on the ground,

Welcoming the initiatives already taken by regional or subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security including the African Union, the European Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern African Community (EAC), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin America and Caribbean

States (CELAC), the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA),

Welcoming the United Nations partnership with the African Union in the field of peacekeeping, including by supporting the African Union's efforts to develop policy, guidance and training in particular in the areas of security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction, women peace and security and the protection of civilians including child protection and the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations, thereby welcoming the Framework of Cooperation between the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the African Union signed on 31 January 2014 and calling for its implementation,

Recalling in this regard its commitment to regularly assess, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, the strength, mandate, and composition of peacekeeping operations with a view to making the necessary adjustments where appropriate, according to progress achieved or changing circumstances on the ground including in security, thereby allowing, on a case-by-case basis, reconfiguration, transition or withdrawal,

Emphasizing that United Nations peacekeeping activities should be conducted in a manner so as to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of relapse into armed conflict and progress towards sustainable peace and development, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the needs and situation of the country concerned,

Recognizing that one major constraint facing some regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in effectively carrying out the mandate of maintaining regional peace and security is securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources,

Recalling its resolution 1809 (2008), which welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal to establish a joint African Union-United Nations panel to consider options for supporting regional organizations when they undertake peacekeeping operations pursuant to a Security Council mandate; and welcoming the steps taken by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to generate resources from within African Union Member States in support of peace support operations,

Political

1. *Underlines* the importance of partnership and cooperation with relevant regional and subregional organizations and arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, in supporting peacekeeping operations, including on issues relating to the protection of civilians, taking into account the respective mandates of peacekeeping operations, and peacebuilding activities as well as forging greater regional and national ownership, and furthermore, reiterates that the growing contribution made by regional and subregional organizations can usefully complement the work of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, and stresses in this regard that such contribution must be made in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, including the need for regional and subregional organizations at all

times to keep the Security Council fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation for the maintenance of international peace and security;

2. *Expresses* its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Encourages* the continuing involvement of regional and subregional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, including through conflict prevention, confidence-building and mediation efforts;

4. *Welcomes* and further encourages the ongoing efforts of the African Union and the subregional organizations to strengthen their peacekeeping capacity and to undertake peacekeeping operations on the continent, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, and to coordinate, with the United Nations, through the Peace and Security Council, as well as ongoing efforts to develop a continental early warning system, response capacity such as the African Standby Force (ASF) and enhanced mediation capacity, including through the Panel of the Wise;

5. *Welcomes* in that regard the recent steps taken by the EAC to activate its standby arrangements and generate the required contribution in the context of the ASF;

6. *Underscores* the need to strengthen the role of both United Nations and regional organizations' headquarters in providing strategic guidance and support to the missions' command and control structures to ensure that operations are managed effectively;

7. *Welcomes* recent developments regarding cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), including the contribution of the European Union to the enhancement of African Union capacities; and further encourages regional and subregional organizations to strengthen and increase cooperation among them including efforts to enhance their respective capacities, in the maintenance of international peace and security;

8. *Recognizes* the need to further strengthen cooperation and consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries, including through triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, and encourages active participation of all stakeholders in open and more frequent consultation processes with a view to enhance the efficiency of the implementation of the mandates;

9. *Encourages* the Peacebuilding Commission to continue to work in close consultation with regional and subregional organizations and arrangements, with a view to ensuring more consistent and integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

10. *Encourages* pertinent regional and subregional organizations and arrangements to help address the widespread impact of armed conflict on children, invites them to continue the mainstreaming of child protection into their advocacy, policies, programmes and mission planning, the development and expansion of guidelines to protect children affected by armed conflict as well as the training of personnel and the inclusion of child protection staff in their peacekeeping and field

operations, and reiterates its call for the establishment of child protection mechanisms within their secretariats, including through the appointment of child protection focal points;

Operational

11. *Reaffirms* its intention to consider further steps to promote closer and more operational cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and of ensuring coherence, synergy and collective effectiveness of their efforts; and in this regard, welcomes the already existing strong cooperation initiatives between the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union;

12. *Stresses* the importance for the United Nations of developing regional and subregional organizations' ability to deploy peacekeeping forces rapidly in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations or other Security Council-mandated operations, and welcomes relevant initiatives taken in this regard;

13. *Requests* in that context the Secretary-General to initiate in full and close cooperation with the African Union a lessons learned exercise on the transitions from the African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic and to produce specific recommendations that could be used for possible future transitional arrangements not later than 31 December 2014;

14. *Encourages* the United Nations and regional organizations, especially the African Union to take concrete steps to strengthen their relationships and develop a more effective partnership when addressing issues of mutual interest and underscores the need to enhance the United Nations and regional organizations' predeployment joint planning and joint mission assessment processes to increase effectiveness of peacekeeping mission;

15. *Stresses* the need for the United Nations and the African Union to work to ensure that women and gender perspectives are fully integrated into all peace and security efforts undertaken by the two organizations, including by building the necessary capacity, encourages regional and subregional organizations to include gender expertise in peacekeeping and field operations, as appropriate, and increase female leadership in regional and subregional peacekeeping efforts;

16. *Encourages* the Secretary-General and regional and subregional organizations and arrangements to enhance information-sharing on their respective capabilities and lessons learned in maintaining international peace and security and to continue to compile best practices, in particular in the field of mediation, good offices and peacekeeping and also encourages strengthening of cooperation and dialogue among regional and subregional organizations in this regard;

17. *Recognises* the inclusive consultative processes undertaken by the Police Division in the development of the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, and encourages closer coordination and cooperation on policing issues between the United Nations Secretariat and international, regional and subregional organizations, including through training, the sharing and exchange of knowledge, thematic expertise and operational support as appropriate;

18. *Encourages* the increased engagement of the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) as coordinating structures, aimed at providing necessary expertise and transfer of technical knowledge to enhance the capacity of the African Union's Peace Support Operations Division including in mission planning and management, as well as the deployment of the Department of Political Affairs' staff to work with the African Union on the effective operationalization of the Panel of the Wise and other mediation programmes;

19. *Calls on* the Secretary-General to coordinate with and support the African Union Commission in its development of a list of needed capacities and recommendations on ways the African Union can further develop its military, police, technical, logistic and administrative capabilities, welcomes the practice of staff exchanges, especially between the UN and AU and encourages its continuity particularly the staff in the financial and logistical areas, and further encourages the African Union to identify its priorities in personnel training, particularly in those areas dealing with financial, logistic and administrative matters;

20. *Invites* regional and subregional organizations to accelerate the establishment of Standby Arrangements System for conflict prevention and peacekeeping, welcomes in that regard the commitment made by the African leaders at the Malabo Summit of 26-27 June 2014 and steps taken by the African Union Commission to operationalize the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), and encourages the AU Member States to generate substantive pledges to this initiative, and further encourages the African Union Commission to harmonize this concept with the ASF;

Financial

21. *Reaffirms* its previous resolutions and statements by its President regarding the Prodi Report, including S/PRST/2010/21, S/PRST/2009/26, and S/PRST/2013/12 as well as resolutions 1809 (2008), 2033 (2012) and 2086 (2013);

22. *Reiterates* that regional organizations have the responsibility to secure human, financial logistical and other resources for their organizations, including through contributions by their members and support from partners and welcomes the valuable financial support provided from partners in this regard;

23. *Stresses* the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations when they undertake peacekeeping under a Security Council mandate, and recognizes the benefit of joint planning missions and assessment visits in determining the needs of regional peace support operations;

24. *Reiterates* its resolve to give peacekeeping operations clear, credible and achievable mandates matched by appropriate resources;

25. *Urges* Member States and relevant international organizations to contribute to strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations, in particular of African regional and subregional organizations, in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization, including through the provision of human, technical and financial assistance;

26. *Welcomes* in this regard the support provided by the European Union through the African Peace Facility, in particular the support provided to AMISOM and MISCA;

27. *Further welcomes* the extensive support by bilateral partners of the African Union for the deployment of African-led operations and encourages them to pursue these efforts;

28. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the AU Commission and EU to produce, not later than 31 March 2015, an assessment report and recommendations on the progress of the partnerships between the UN and relevant regional organizations in peacekeeping operations;

29. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2014/533

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the tenth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations from 24 June to 25 July 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

During the period under review, the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic continued its work. Following the completion of the removal of declared chemical weapons materials from the Syrian Arab Republic at the end of the previous reporting period, attention focused on the remaining aspects of the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme as reported in my letter dated 26 June 2014 (S/2014/444).

Activities towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic

On 2 July 2014, the Danish cargo vessel *Ark Futura* successfully transloaded the majority of its cargo of priority chemical weapons materials to the United States maritime vessel *Cape Ray* at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro. Destruction of these materials has since commenced on board the *Cape Ray* in international waters. Delivery of the remaining chemical weapons materials on board the *Ark Futura* and those transported by the Norwegian cargo vessel *Taiko* was successfully concluded during the reporting period.

The Joint Mission participated in technical meetings held in Moscow on 27 and 28 June, and in Beirut on 14 and 15 July, at which the participants sought to prepare a comprehensive proposal for the destruction of the 12 remaining production facilities. On 24 July, the OPCW Executive Council approved the combined plans for the destruction and verification of 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic.

During the period under review, the Joint Mission maintained its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the original declaration of its chemical weapons programme. OPCW technical experts were deployed to Damascus from

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28 June to 5 July, to seek clarifications on outstanding issues. States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention continued to review this issue at OPCW headquarters.

The Joint Mission continued to adjust its footprint inside the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with the requirements following the removal of the last remaining declared chemical weapons materials during the preceding reporting period and the prevailing security situation. At all times the Joint Mission maintained readiness to respond to any changes in those requirements at short notice. Discussions continued with OPCW regarding possible successor arrangements.

Conclusion

I welcome the decision of the OPCW Executive Council on the combined plans for the destruction and verification of 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic. I call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to implement that decision in a timely manner. I also urge the Syrian Arab Republic to continue its efforts towards the full elimination of its chemical weapons programme at the earliest possible opportunity, including the resolution of any possible outstanding issues related to its initial declaration.

I remain very concerned about continuing allegations regarding the use of toxic chemicals in the Syrian conflict. I strongly condemn any such use by any party to the conflict. I trust that those found responsible will be brought to justice.

Innocent civilians continue to be the principal victims of the protracted conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. The violence must stop. While modest in comparison with the greater challenges of the Syrian conflict, the progress towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme continues to highlight the unity of purpose and commitment of all stakeholders who are making this progress possible and to whom I would like to reiterate my appreciation.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank the Special Coordinator, Sigrid Kaag, and all staff of the Joint Mission for their continuous efforts to ensure full implementation of mandated tasks.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme" prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 24 June to 24 July 2014 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

Note by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the tenth such monthly report.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 24 June to 24 July 2014.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

4. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. As reported in the previous monthly report (EC-76/DG.14, dated 25 June 2014), the final shipment of declared chemicals identified for removal from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic took place on 23 June 2014. In addition, all declared stocks of the Category 1 chemical isopropanol have been destroyed within the Syrian Arab Republic. Progress achieved within the current reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling other obligations is described below:

(a) Intensive consultations have taken place relating to the destruction of aircraft hangars and underground structures at 12 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs). A technical meeting between representatives of the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America, as well as representatives of the Secretariat, took place in Moscow from 26 to 28 June 2014. A technical meeting between the Secretariat and representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic was also held in Beirut from 14 to 15 July 2014. As a result of these discussions and the progress that was made, the Council at its Forty-Third Meeting adopted a decision on the combined plans for the destruction and verification of 12 declared CWPFs in the Syrian Arab Republic (EC-M-43/DEC.1, dated 24 July 2014). The Council also noted a Note by the Director-General on the destruction and verification of these facilities (EC-M-43/DG.1/Rev.1, dated 21 July

2014), a Note by the Director-General on the combined destruction and verification plans for these facilities (EC-M-40/DG.2, dated 27 March 2014 and Add.1, dated 20 July 2014), as well as a national paper by the Syrian Arab Republic on the detailed destruction plan for these facilities (EC-M-40/P/NAT.2, dated 24 March 2014, and Add.1 and Add.2, both dated 20 July 2014);

(b) On 14 July 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a further amendment to its initial declaration submitted on 23 October 2013. In the amendment, the Syrian Arab Republic declared as a CWPF a facility for the production of ricin. The newly declared facility is subject to verification and destruction, although it is located in an area that is not under Syrian Government control. According to the amendment, the entire quantity of ricin produced was disposed of prior to the entry into force of the Convention for the Syrian Arab Republic. The amendment also includes information regarding two other chemical weapons related facilities for research and development as well as Category 3 unfilled chemical munitions;

(c) On 14 July 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic also submitted to the Secretariat a destruction plan for the two items declared by the Government as abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) which, as verified by the Secretariat, contain the chemical agent sarin. The plan will be submitted to the Council for its approval in due course;

(d) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs. The eighth such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 18 July 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-M-43/P/NAT.1, dated 18 July 2014); and

(e) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission (hereinafter "the Joint Mission") in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

5. Following the complete removal of identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 June 2014, destruction activities are well under way. The following subparagraphs provide information on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons on board the United States vessel MV *Cape Ray*, at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, and at facilities sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2 (dated 17 December 2013):

(a) The MV *Cape Ray* arrived on 1 July 2014 at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, where shipping containers holding the declared chemicals HD and DF were transloaded from the Danish cargo ship *Ark Futura*. The MV *Cape Ray* then proceeded to international waters in the Mediterranean on 2 July 2014. Destruction operations on board the MV *Cape Ray* began on 9 July 2014. An OPCW inspection team is on board the MV *Cape Ray* to verify the destruction and to ensure that it is

in accordance with paragraph 8 and subparagraph 12(f) of EC-M-34/DEC.1. As at the cut-off date of this report, 22 per cent of the DF has been verified as destroyed on board the MV *Cape Ray*. All liquid waste produced by the hydrolysis of DF was pumped directly into ISO tanks on the ship, pending further treatment at the Ekokem Riihimäki waste treatment and disposal facility in Finland, one of the two commercial facilities selected through the tender process organized by the OPCW;

(b) As reported in the previous monthly report, the Ekokem Riihimäki facility in Finland received chemicals transported by the Norwegian cargo ship *Taiko*, following their offloading at the port of Hamina Kotka on 21 June 2014. The last consignment of four maritime shipping containers with chemicals was offloaded from the *Ark Futura* at the port of Hamina Kotka in Finland on 20 July 2014. As at the cut-off date of this report, 38 per cent of the received chemicals have been destroyed by Ekokem in Finland, with one of the Category 1 chemicals received with the first delivery on 21 June 2014 having been completely destroyed;

(c) Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC in the United States of America, the other commercial facility selected through the tender process organized by the OPCW, received the declared chemicals transported by the *Taiko* on 9 July 2014. Destruction activities began on 11 July 2014 and, as at the cut-off date of this report, 42 per cent of the received chemicals have been destroyed by Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC;

(d) Veolia Environmental Services (UK) in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland received declared chemicals transported from the Syrian Arab Republic by the *Ark Futura* on 15 and 16 July 2014. Because of the delayed removal from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic of the remaining hydrogen fluoride and hydrochloric acid, these chemicals could not be transported by the Norwegian cargo vessel *Taiko* to Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC, in the United States of America as originally intended. As a result, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland offered, through an in-kind contribution, to directly sponsor Veolia Environmental Services (UK) and Mexichem UK Limited to destroy the aforementioned remaining hydrochloric acid and hydrogen fluoride, respectively. This offer was formalized in an exchange of letters dated 8 July 2014 and, at its Seventy-Sixth Session, the Council considered and approved amendments and modifications to the original facility arrangement (EC-76/DEC.5, dated 11 July 2014). As at the cut-off date of this report, 4 per cent of the received chemicals have been destroyed by Veolia Environmental Services (UK). Destruction activities at Mexichem UK Limited are planned for late 2014;

(e) Once the neutralization operation on board the MV *Cape Ray* has been completed, the vessel will deliver the HD effluent to the GEKA facility in Munster, Germany, and the DF effluent to Ekokem's facility in Riihimäki, Finland, for disposal.

6. Taken together, the destruction activities described in subparagraphs 5 (a) to 5 (d) above mean that, as at the cut-off date of this report, 36.6 per cent of the Category 1 chemicals and 12.4 per cent of the Category 2 chemicals had been destroyed, representing a combined total of 32 per cent, including the isopropanol previously destroyed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will continue to provide such information during briefings to States Parties in The Hague and through the monthly reports. Timelines for the completion of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons were provided in the overall report on the elimination of the Syrian chemical

weapons programme (paragraph 25 of EC-76/DG.16, dated 4 July 2014), which was noted by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

7. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organizations and between the offices in The Hague, New York, Damascus, and Cyprus. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission, Ms Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. As at the cut-off date of this report, two OPCW staff members were deployed as part of the Joint Mission in Damascus, and one logistics officer in Beirut.

8. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties hosting a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat has continued to provide regular information briefings to States Parties in The Hague on behalf of the Director-General.

9. A team of four OPCW inspectors is permanently on board the MV *Cape Ray* as it neutralizes HD and DF, and OPCW inspectors have carried out inspections at the commercial facilities to verify destruction activities. OPCW inspectors were also present when the *Taiko* delivered chemicals in Finland and in the United States of America, and when the *Ark Futura* delivered chemicals in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in Finland. OPCW inspectors were also present in Gioia Tauro when declared chemicals were transloaded from the *Ark Futura* to the MV *Cape Ray* on 2 July 2014. The OPCW is receiving weekly updates on the progress of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and, as instructed by the Council in paragraph 4 of decision EC-M-38/DEC.1 (dated 30 January 2014), reports on them through these monthly reports. In the interests of transparency, the OPCW is also reporting on the progress in destruction through its public website.

10. The Secretariat briefed the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session on its ongoing consultations with the Syrian Arab Republic regarding its declaration and related disclosures. A team of experts from the Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab Republic from 30 June to 5 July 2014. Further details regarding the outcome of the most recent technical discussions are provided in subparagraph 4 (b) above. The Council urged the Secretariat and the Syrian authorities to continue to cooperate through technical discussions on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration, with a view to resolving as quickly as possible questions raised by the Secretariat to ensure the declaration's accuracy and completeness.

11. During the reporting period, the Secretariat agreed upon amendments and modifications to the arrangement with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland governing on-site inspections at the Ellesmere Port High Temperature Incinerator and Marchwood Military Port, which was adopted by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (EC-75/DEC.3, dated 5 March 2014). As reported in subparagraph 5 (d) above, the amendments and modifications were considered and approved by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session.

Supplementary resources

12. As at the cut-off date of this report, the total contribution received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 50.3 million. Contributions have been received from Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

Conclusion

13. The complete removal of the identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic and the steady progress being made in their destruction are welcome developments, as is the Council's decision on the issue of the destruction of the 12 remaining CWPFs. Destruction activities at those locations are expected to begin within two months' time. The Secretariat will regularly report to the Council on the progress being made, together with recommendations for any adjustments in the destruction schedule, if necessary.

14. With regard to the Fact-Finding Mission to establish the facts surrounding the allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session underlined that the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community. The Council re-emphasized its unequivocal support for the Director-General's decision to continue the Mission, while stressing that the safety and security of Mission personnel remains the top priority.